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This paper uses data envelopment analysis to examine the technical efficiency (TE) of 45 British 
universities in the period 1980/81 to 1992/93.  This period was chosen primarily because it was 
characterized by major changes in public funding and in student : staff ratios.  To shed light on the 
causes of variations in efficiency, TE is decomposed into pure technical efficiency (PTE), congestion 
efficiency (CE) and scale efficiency (SE).  The analysis indicates that there was a substantial rise in the 
weighted geometric mean TE score during the study period, although this rise was most noticeable 
between 1987/88 and 1990/91.  The rising TE scores are attributed largely to the gains in PTE and CE, 
with SE playing a minor role.  The Malmquist approach is then used to distinguish between changes in 
technical efficiency and intertemporal shifts in the efficiency frontier.  The results reveal that total factor 
productivity rose by 51.5% between 1980/81 and 1992/93, and that most of this increase was due to a 
substantial outward shift in the efficiency frontier during this period. 
 
Introduction 
In the early 1980s, over 80% of the recurrent income of universities in the UK was obtained from the 
Treasury (Johnes & Taylor, 1990, p.  38) and, as a result of this dependency on public funding, 
universities came under scrutiny.  Although they are now substantially less dependent on public funds, 
the efficiency of British universities continues to be the subject of political and economic debate. 
  In 1984, the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals responded to the government's wish for 
an efficiency study of universities by setting up the Jarratt Committee.  This committee recommended 
wide-ranging changes in the management of universities and, inter alia, the introduction of appropriate 
performance indicators (Cave et al., 1997, p. 4).  Furthermore, a White Paper in 1987 proposed radical 
new arrangements for the distribution of public funds to universities (ibid., p. 6).  Instead of obtaining 
grants to cover their costs, universities would need to enter into contracts with the Universities Funding 
Council to provide specific academic outputs in return for the resources granted to them (ibid.).  The 
government urged higher education to provide wider access to its services, and be more responsive to the needs of industry and commerce, less dependent on public funding and more cost-conscious in managing 
its resources (Johnes & Taylor, 1990, p. 12).  With the aim of making universities more responsive to 
students' demand for higher education, and to encourage them to exploit any spare capacity, an 
increasing proportion of public funds would henceforth be provided in the form of fee income rather 
than as block grants (ibid., pp. 42–47). 
  Given these calls for greater efficiency, it is of considerable interest to examine how well universities 
responded to the increased pressure put upon them.  This study uses data envelopment analysis (DEA) to 
measure the relative efficiency of 45 universities in the UK over the period 1980/81 to 1992/93.
2  This 
approach makes it possible to measure the degree of variation in efficiency across the sector as a whole, 
and to identify possible sources of inefficiency.  An important feature of the variant of DEA employed in 
this paper is its ability to identify ‘congestion’ inefficiency, which is inefficiency arising from negative 
marginal productivity of inputs.
3  More specifically, one of the hypotheses to be examined here is 
whether British universities' efficiency was impaired by the exceptionally rapid expansion in the number 
of students that began in the late 1980s. 
  The focus of most DEA studies of UK universities has been on the relative performance of 
individual departments in a given discipline.
4  A notable exception to this is the interesting study by 
Athanassopoulos and Shale (1997), who apply DEA at the institutional level.  However, their study of 45 
institutions pertains to a single academic year, 1992/93.  By contrast, the primary aim here is to examine 
trends in efficiency over time, along with the underlying causal factors.  The period 1980/81 to 1992/93 
was chosen because it was characterized by major changes in public funding and in student : staff ratios. 
In addition, University Statistics has a consistent set of data for this period on the key variables required. 
A final point is that the exclusion of any new universities created after 1992 means that the sample 
employed here is relatively homogeneous. 
  The standard DEA approach has the disadvantage that it cannot distinguish between changes in 
relative efficiency brought about by movements towards or away from the efficiency frontier in a given 
year and shifts in this frontier over time.  To capture these two sources of change in efficiency, 
Malmquist indices are computed. 
  In the next section, the theory underlying the measurement of technical efficiency is examined.  This 
is followed by a discussion of the variables used.  The DEA and Malmquist results are then presented 
and considered in detail.  Finally, the findings are summarized and conclusions are drawn. 
  2Measuring the Relative Efficiency of British Universities 
One approach to the evaluation of universities' relative efficiency would be to use econometric 
techniques to fit a stochastic cost frontier to data for a cross-section of universities in a given year.  This 
has been done by Izadi et al. (2002), who estimated a model of the form: 





ρ + εi (1) 
where Ei is the total expenditure of university i, Ai is its undergraduate student load in arts subjects, Si is 
its undergraduate student load in the sciences, Pi is its postgraduate student load, and Ri is the value of 
research grants and contracts received.  The error term, εi, has two statistically independent components, 
such that εi = ηi + ωi.  The role of ηi is to capture measurement errors, random influences, etc., whereas ωi 
is there to measure technical inefficiency.  ωi is constrained to be non-negative; a fully efficient 
university would have ωi = 0, whereas ωi > 0 would indicate inefficiency. 
  A big advantage of the above formulation is that it yields useful information concerning the returns 
to scale and scope in higher education; what is more, the information relating to returns to scale is 
provided separately for each explanatory variable.  It is also possible to estimate the technical 
inefficiency of each university.
5  However, whilst the approach taken by Izadi et al. is attractive in many 
ways, it requires fairly complex computations that cannot be performed using standard software 
packages.  In addition, it is not possible to decompose the estimates of ωi so as to shed light on the 
possible causes of inefficiency.  For these reasons, an alternative approach – data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) – is pursued here.
6
  DEA makes use of a linear programming algorithm to construct an ‘efficiency frontier’, with the 
most efficient organizations within a group being used to define the standard against which the 
performance of the other organizations is evaluated.  The concept of efficiency is thus relative rather than 
absolute.  According to Nunamaker (1985, p. 51), the principal strength of DEA “lies in its ability to 
combine multiple inputs and outputs into a single summary measure of efficiency without requiring 
specification of any a priori weights”.  However, a disadvantage of DEA is that the distribution of 
efficiency scores is typically highly skewed, with an unknown theoretical distribution, which creates 
problems when attempting to test hypotheses concerning the relative efficiency of different groups or the 
changes in efficiency over time.
7
  DEA allows us to determine the technical efficiency (TE) of each university for each academic year 
in the sample period.  TE is defined as the ratio of the weighted sum of outputs to the weighted sum of 
  3inputs, as in the following expression for university i: 
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where Qri is the quantity of output r and Xsi is the quantity of input s.  With DEA, the weights uri and vsi 
are determined in such a way that the efficiency of each university is maximized, subject to the following 
constraints: 
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  u ri, vsi ≥ ε  for all r and s  (4) 
 
where ε is a small positive number (e.g. 10
–6).  The first set of constraints dictates that no other university 
j should be able to obtain a TE score in excess of unity by adopting the same set of weights as university 
i, whereas the second set specifies that all weights must be positive.
8
  It is worth noting that DEA deems any deviation from the efficiency frontier to be the result of 
technical inefficiency.  Hence measurement errors, as well as random influences on a university's output, 
are ignored.  Whilst the deterministic nature of the DEA frontier is clearly a disadvantage, this 
shortcoming of DEA is – in the authors' opinion – outweighed by its ease of use and capacity to handle 
the multiple inputs and outputs employed in this study. 
 
Output Variables 
It seems reasonable to argue that a university's output should be defined primarily according to the 
services it provides in terms of teaching, research, consultancy and other educational services.  These 
aspects of a university's activities are captured here via the following output variables: 
•  income from research and consultancy; 
•  the number of undergraduate degrees awarded, adjusted for quality; 
•  the number of postgraduate degrees awarded. 
 
  4Research and Consultancy 
Research is clearly an important aspect of output in its own right.  It may also indirectly influence the 
quality of teaching output by affecting a university's physical resources and the focus of its staff. 
  Since universities sell their services to government and industry, the income received can be used to 
estimate the value of the output produced.  However, the use of research income as a measure of output 
is problematic, since such income may be considered to be an input into the research process rather than 
an output (Johnes & Johnes, 1993, p. 338).  Research income may also be distorted by differences in 
research costs across academic disciplines.  On the other hand, research income is likely to reflect the 
perceived quality, as well as quantity, of research output and it should provide a more up-to-date picture 
of such output than, for example, publications or citations, for which there is bound to be a considerable 
time lag.  Moreover, the necessary information is readily available.  Indeed, in a study of this nature, one 
has little option but to use research income as a proxy for research output since data for most alternative 
variables are not available on an annual basis.
9  For instance, whilst research ratings might be a better 
measure than research income, such ratings appear too infrequently to be of use here.  With regard to 
consultancy income, it should be noted that some disciplines offer more scope for lucrative consultancies 
than do others, so that a university's discipline mix may well affect this source of income. 
 
Undergraduate Degrees 
The number of undergraduate degrees awarded is clearly an important measure of the output of any 
university.  However, an obvious shortcoming of this measure is that it fails to take any account of the 
quality of the degrees awarded. 
  One way of taking quality into account would be to use the graduate unemployment rate, 
standardized by subject and gender mix, as an index of the quality of degrees awarded.  However, whilst 
this is an intrinsically attractive measure, Johnes et al. (1987) note some serious problems regarding the 
comparability of such rates.  It is also a measure that is strongly biased in favour of Oxford, Cambridge 
and Durham (ibid., pp. 701–702). 
  An alternative approach would be to multiply the number of degrees awarded by the proportion of 
students gaining ‘good’ degrees, defined in some way.  This approach is an attractive one inasmuch as 
the quality of teaching should be reflected in students' achievements and hence in the class distribution of 
degrees awarded.  Nonetheless, it must be recognized that students' achievements depend not only on the 
quality of teaching but also on the ability of the students and their initial qualifications.  Another 
  5potential problem with the use of degree results is the possible variation, both across institutions and 
intertemporally, in the implicit standards set for particular classes of degree and also in the models of 
assessment used (e.g., the mix of coursework and examinations). 
  With degree results, there is a choice, at least in principle, between a fairly narrow definition of 
quality – the proportion of first-class honours degrees awarded to undergraduate students – and a broader 
definition comprising both firsts and upper seconds.  However, the existence of undivided seconds at 
Oxford and several Scottish universities (Johnes et al., 1987, p. 703) creates a problem in using a broader 
definition.  A more serious obstacle is the fact that, while University Statistics has annual data on the 
number of first-class degrees awarded, it has no data on the number of upper seconds. For these reasons, 
the proportion of firsts will be used here to adjust for the quality of undergraduate degrees awarded.  
This means that the output variable becomes the number of firsts awarded.  The sensitivity of the results 
to the use of this variable is considered later in the paper. 
 
Postgraduate Degrees 
For simplicity, and in order to avoid artificially boosting the efficiency scores, masters degrees and 
doctorates were aggregated into a single variable.
10  A disadvantage of this is, of course, that variations 
across universities in the ratio of masters degrees to doctorates are thereby ignored.  This variable also 
fails to take account of possible differences in the quality of postgraduate degrees. 
 
Input Variables 
The following input variables are used in the DEA analysis: 
•  the number of staff; 
•  the number of undergraduate students; 
•  the number of postgraduate students; 
•  aggregate departmental expenditure. 
Number of Staff.  This variable includes both academic and academic-related staff.  Part-time staff were 
given a weight of 0.5. 
Number of Students.  This refers to the full-time equivalent student load. 
Aggregate Departmental Expenditure.  This variable includes departmental expenditure on equipment, 
salaries and wages of non-academic staff, and so on.  Expenditure on academic staff is not included.  
(See Appendix A for more detailed information concerning inputs.) 
  6Trends in Labour Productivity 
Before we consider the DEA results, it may be of interest to examine the trends in the three output 
variables over the period 1980/81 to 1992/93.  Each variable has been expressed relative to the number 
of staff, to give an indication of labour productivity.  The index of university costs (1985 = 100) was 
used to convert the income from research and consultancy into constant prices. 
  See Figure 1 
  A striking feature of Figure 1 is the fact that there is a clear upward trend in all three measures of 
labour productivity, although the pattern is somewhat different in each case.  For higher degrees, there is 
a steady growth in productivity throughout the period under review, from 3438 higher degrees per 
10,000 staff in 1980/81 to 5495 in 1992/93, an increase of 60%.  The number of first-class degrees 
produced per 10,000 staff increases from 787 in 1980/81 to 1182 in 1992/93, a rise of 50%.  Even so, 
there is a marked dip in the graph in 1986/87.  From Appendix A, Table 6, we can see that the aggregate 
student : staff ratio reached a minimum in that year.  With respect to real income from research and 
consultancy, there is a strong upward trend until 1986/87, but a more modest and uneven rise 
subsequently.  Taking the period as a whole, real income per member of staff almost doubles, from 
£6134 in 1980/81 to £12,091 in 1992/93. 
  A note of caution is called for with regard to the rise in the output of first-class degrees per member 
of staff.  For this to be deemed to be a genuine rise in productivity, we would need to assume that the 
strong upward trend in the proportion of firsts awarded was a consequence of more effective teaching 
and learning rather than a decline in the threshold standard required to gain a first or an improvement in 
the initial qualifications of students.
11
 
Initial DEA Results 
  See Table 1 and Figure 2 
Table 1 displays results that, in different ways, capture trends in the relative performance of the 45 
universities.  First let us consider the unweighted arithmetic mean TE scores, which are also plotted in 
Figure 2 (see the graph labelled UAM).  Two distinct periods stand out.  The first period, from 1980/81 
to 1986/87, was characterized by fairly large fluctuations in the mean scores, with no obvious trend.  By 
contrast, a strong upward trend is evident from 1986/87 onwards, although this was interrupted briefly, 
albeit sharply, in 1989/90.
12  These results indicate a reduction in the amount of variation in performance 
  7across the university sector.  The impression of greater homogeneity is bolstered by the rising minimum 
scores shown in the last column of Table 1.  We can see, for instance, that the least efficient university in 
1986/87 was producing only 56.4% of its potential output, when measured relative to the observed ‘best 
practice’ for that year.
13  By 1992/93, the minimum TE score had increased to 0.742.  Table 1 also shows 
that the standard deviation of the TE scores was much lower in 1992/93 than in 1986/87.  It is evident 
that the gap in TE between the frontier and non-frontier universities was shrinking during this period. 
  The mean TE scores considered thus far take no account of differences in the number of students in 
each university.  For instance, London had over 13% of the total number of UK university students in 
1992/93, whereas Essex had only 1%.  Therefore, in order to gain a more accurate picture of the 
performance of the sector as a whole, each university's TE score was weighted by its relative share of 
students, to obtain a weighted arithmetic mean (WAM).  The results are presented in Table  1 and 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
  Figure 2 reveals that, in most cases, the weighting has no discernible impact, although this is clearly 
not the case in first four years.
14  These exceptions suggest that there may be some association between a 
university's size and its TE score.  However, for each of the first four years, only a very weak positive 
correlation was found between universities' TE scores and their size, when measured in terms of 
students.
15  For the final two years, the correlations were negative but again close to zero.  It is worth 
noting that the use of weighted scores has not fundamentally altered the earlier finding of a strong 
upward trend in mean TE from 1986/87 onwards, with a sharp dip in 1989/90. 
  See Figure 3 
  Let us now consider the impact of using the weighted geometric mean (WGM) as the measure of 
central tendency.  This statistic is more appropriate than the weighted arithmetic mean (WAM) because 
it can be decomposed in a straightforward way into component indices.  From Table 1 and Figure 3, we 
can see that the WGM is invariably lower than the WAM, but follows the same pattern.  Towards the 
end of the period, the two measures get closer.  This is to be expected, given the rise in the raw scores 
and the fact that both measures have a maximum value of unity. 
 
Decomposition of Technical Efficiency 
In order to shed some light on the possible causes of the intertemporal fluctuations and trends in TE 
identified earlier, it is useful to break down TE into three multiplicative components, such that: 
  8 TE  ≡ PTE × CE × SE  (5) 
where PTE denotes ‘pure’ technical efficiency, CE denotes congestion efficiency and SE denotes scale 
efficiency.  Each component of identity (5) is constrained to lie in the interval [0, 1].  The particular 
decomposition discussed here mirrors that of Byrnes et al. (1984) and Färe et al. (1985a), who built upon 
the pioneering work of Farrell (1957).  Scale efficiency will be examined first. 
  See Figure 4 
  Figure 4 illustrates the situation facing a number of hypothetical universities.  The diagram shows 
the inputs each university requires to produce one unit of output.
16  Universities I, E and F are operating 
under constant returns to scale and are fully efficient in other respects too (TE = 1).
17  They are assumed 
to be in long-run equilibrium.  Now consider university G.  Whilst this university is technically efficient 
given its scale, this scale is not optimal.  In terms of identity (5), PTE = CE = 1 but SE < 1.  It is 
presumed that, by adjusting its scale, university G could operate more efficiently and thereby reduce the 
inputs it needs to produce each unit of output.  To become fully efficient, it would need to reduce its 
inputs to the levels currently achieved by university F.  This adjustment could only be achieved in the 
long run (cf. Färe et al., 1985a, p. 95).  The performance of university G in terms of scale efficiency can 
be measured by the ratio SE = OF/OG, which is below the optimum of SE = 1.  Universities E and H can 
be compared in the same way. 
  ‘Congestion’ occurs when a productive input is overused to such an extent that its marginal product 
becomes negative.
18  This gives rise to an isoquant that, beyond a point, slopes upwards from left to 
right. The segment HM′ of isoquant M′M in Figure 4 illustrates congestion.
19  Essentially what has 
occurred here is that the number of students has increased to the point where the enrolment of an 
additional student, with the number of staff held constant, would reduce the output of a university such 
as K, i.e. the marginal productivity of students has become negative!  Conversely, a decrease in the 
number of students, with the number of staff held constant, would raise output.  Clearly, university K is 
suffering from serious congestion.  It could move from point K to point J, reducing both inputs 
proportionally, without experiencing a fall in output.  Following Färe et al. (1985a, pp. 94–95), we 
measure congestion in terms of the distance between a point on the existing (upward-sloping) isoquant to 
a point on the nearest congestion-free (vertical) isoquant.  Hence the congestion efficiency of university 
K can be measured by the ratio CE = OJ/OK, which falls short of the optimum of CE = 1. 
  University L in Figure 4 is in the unfortunate situation of experiencing all three types of inefficiency. 
  9Its scale efficiency ratio of SE  =  OI/OJ is below unity, as is its congestion efficiency ratio of 
CE = OJ/OK.  It also suffers from ‘pure’ technical inefficiency as it is operating to the right of isoquant 
M′M; its score here is given by the ratio PTE = OK/OL, which again is below one.  Finally, its technical 
efficiency, as defined by the ratio TE = OI/OL, is well below unity.  Identity (5) can now easily be 
verified by substituting in the relevant ratios for university L. 
 Since  TE  ≡ PTE × CE × SE, its intertemporal variation can be explained by considering the 
behaviour of its three component ratios.  These ratios were computed for each university for each year in 
the period 1980/81 to 1992/93, by solving a series of linear programming problems (see Appendix B).  
The weighted geometric means of TE, PTE, CE and SE are displayed in Table  2 and graphed in 
Figure 5.
20  These are denoted hereafter as WGMte, WGMpte, WGMce and WGMse. 
  See Table 2 and Figure 5 
  For the period as a whole, WGMte rose from 0.859 to 0.916.  However, even though all its 
components increased, they did so by differing amounts: WGMpte from 0.954 to 0.984, WGMce from 
0.942 to 0.967 and WGMse from 0.955 to 0.963.  It is evident, therefore, that the rise in TE was largely 
due to the gains in PTE and CE, with SE playing a minor role.  The rising PTE and CE scores show that, 
by cutting down on any unnecessary inputs, universities were getting closer to a congestion-free 
isoquant.  This process corresponds to a movement from, say, point L towards point J in Figure 4. 
  Table 2 also gives information concerning returns to scale.  The results suggest that, in 1992/93, 21 
universities were too large, 9 were too small and 15 were of optimal size.
21  By contrast, in 1980/81, 
there were roughly equal numbers of universities in the three categories.  However, we need to bear in 
mind that the departures from constant returns were modest in most cases; the fact that WGMse is so high 
in both years provides little scope for dispersion in returns to scale. 
  Figure 5 sheds some new light on the behaviour of the TE scores.  During the subperiod 1980/81 to 
1983/84, WGMte first rose and then fell.  Here the shape of the TE graph is largely determined by the 
changes in SE.  In contrast, between 1983/84 and 1986/87, WGMte was relatively stable.  However, this 
stability masks some substantial, and largely offsetting, changes in CE and SE. 
  A strong upward trend in WGMte began in 1986/87, although this was interrupted briefly, albeit 
sharply, in 1989/90.  This interruption was almost entirely due to a temporary decline in WGMce.  
Figure 5 shows a large rise in WGMte in 1990/91 because the rebound in WGMce was reinforced by a 
rise in both WGMpte and WGMse.  If we ignore these aberrations, we can see that the impressive rise in 
  10WGMte between 1986/87 and 1990/91 was the result of an improvement in all three types of efficiency, 
although the rise in WGMpte was much smaller than that in WGMce and WGMse.  This can be explained 
by the fact that WGMpte was much higher to start with. 
  The behaviour of congestion efficiency is interesting.  WGMce rose strongly between 1984/85 and 
1988/89, yet this period was followed by a succession of ups and downs about a slight upward trend.  It 
would seem that, during the first period, universities were able to reduce congestion because there was 
only a moderate growth in student numbers and no rise in the student : staff ratio (see Appendix A, 
Table 6).  By contrast, the second period was characterized by a sharply rising ratio, which made it very 
difficult to achieve any further gains in CE.  Indeed, it is remarkable that WGMce is slightly higher in 
1992/93 than in 1988/89.  As for the ups and downs in this statistic, these may be due to lags in 
universities' adjustments to rising student : staff ratios. 
   Nevertheless, it might be objected that any rise in the student : staff ratio could be accommodated 
by a sufficient improvement in the frontier technology and thus not lead to greater congestion.  However, 
whilst this argument may be true in the long run, it is less compelling in the short run, especially in 
situations where the rise in the ratio is both rapid and unforeseen. 
 
A Malmquist Analysis 
From the analysis thus far, it is evident that British universities became more similar in terms of their TE 
scores during the period under review.  This convergence in performance is important in the sense that 
the sector as a whole cannot attain its maximum potential output if relative inefficiency continues to 
exist.  However, a rise in the mean TE score from one year to the next does not necessarily indicate 
improved performance, as it may merely reflect an inward shift of the efficiency frontier.  Malmquist 
indices, as explained below, provide a useful way of distinguishing between changes in technical 
efficiency and shifts in the efficiency frontier over time.
22
 
Malmquist Total Factor Productivity (TFP) Indices 
A TFP index measures the change in total output relative to the change in the usage of all inputs.  The 
change in a TFP index can be decomposed into two components: 
•  the change in technical efficiency (universities getting closer to or further away from the efficiency 
frontier). 
•  the change in technology (shifts in the efficiency frontier). 
  11 
 A  Malmquist TFP index is defined using distance functions.  It is the geometric mean of two TFP 
indices, one evaluated with respect to the technology (efficiency frontier) in the current period t and the 
other with respect to the technology in the base period s (see Coelli et al., 1998, pp. 222–226).  With a 
Malmquist TFP index, the change in TE for university i is measured by the ratio TEi,t/TEi,s. 
  See Table 3 
  Now consider the findings displayed in Table 3.  The third column shows the results of using 
geometric means to aggregate the ratios TEi,t/TEi,s for the 45 universities.  The numbers in the subsequent 
three columns were computed in like fashion.  The results indicate, for example, that TE improved by 
0.9% between 1981/82 and 1982/83.  This was the net outcome of a simultaneous rise of 1.3% in PTE 
and fall of 0.4% in CE, with no change in SE.  Rounding apart, the numbers in the third column are the 
product of those in the next three columns. 
  The DEAP program (see Coelli et al., 1998, pp. 226–232) was used to generate the first two 
columns of Table 3.  Again, rounding apart, the figures in the first column are the product of those in the 
next two columns.  The results indicate, for example, that TFP improved by 4.7% between 1982/83 and 
1983/84.  This was the net outcome of a simultaneous improvement of 6.3% in technology (an outward 
shift in the efficiency frontier) but deterioration of 1.5% in TE (universities moving away from the 
frontier). 
  However, whilst Table 3 is useful in highlighting annual changes, it is not easy to see the cumulative 
effects of changes in efficiency.  The chained indices presented in Table 4 provide a way of quantifying 
these cumulative effects.
23
  See Table 4 
  Table 4 reveals that there was a large rise of 51.5% in TFP between 1980/81 and 1992/93.  What is 
interesting about this rise in productivity is that it was brought about predominantly by an outward shift 
in the efficiency frontier rather than by enhanced technical efficiency: the results show that frontier 
technology improved by 39.1% whereas TE rose by only 8.8%.  It is worth noting that this modest rise in 
TE was largely due to the gains in PTE (4.1%) and CE (2.9%).  By contrast, the rise in SE over the 
twelve-year period was a mere 1.5%. 
See Figure 6 
  The trends in TFP, frontier technology and technical efficiency are illustrated in Figure 6 by the 
graphs labelled TFP, TECH and TE.  What is most striking about this figure is the way in which the 
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of the flattening out of the TECH graph.  For the next two years, TFP mimics the rise and fall of TE.  
There is a curious ‘bowl’ shape to the TECH graph in the final three years, which indicates that the 
efficiency frontier shifted inwards and then outwards again.  It is interesting to see how the rise in TE 
between 1989/90 and 1990/91 more than compensated for the inward shift of the efficiency frontier, 
thereby causing TFP to rise.  Also, notwithstanding a large outward shift in the efficiency frontier 
between 1991/92 and 1992/93, universities' technical efficiency did not suffer and, in fact, slightly 
improved.  This strong performance led to a very large rise in TFP. 
  In view of the importance of technical efficiency in explaining the shape of the TFP graph from 
1987/88 onwards, it may be worthwhile to look briefly at the factors underlying the TE graph.  From 
Table 3 we can see that SE was the driving force behind the rise in TE between 1987/88 and 1988/89, 
whereas CE was the main factor behind its fall the following year.  The large rise in TE between 1989/90 
and 1990/91 was the outcome of substantial gains in both PTE and CE.  Finally, the slight upward tilt of 
the TE graph in the last two years hides the fact that this period was characterized by largely offsetting 
movements in all three components of the TE index. 
  The financial and other aspects of the environment facing universities changed considerably during 
the thirteen academic years under examination here.  The possible consequences of this changing 
environment will now be considered. 
 
The Changing Environment 
The severe financial pressures which British universities experienced during the 1970s were reinforced 
by the change of government in May 1979.  Notwithstanding a warning by the University Grants 
Committee that any cuts in Treasury funding in excess of 2.5% in real terms would seriously impair 
efficiency, real funding was, in fact, cut by 8.7% between 1980/81 and 1984/85 (Johnes & Taylor, 1990, 
pp. 33–35).  What is more, the cuts were applied highly selectively (ibid.).  To see whether these cuts 
had a significant impact on universities' technical efficiency, the change in each university's TE score 
between 1980/81 and 1984/85 was correlated with the percentage change in real Treasury funding.  This 
produced a correlation coefficient of –0.303, which is significant at the 5% level (using a two-tailed 
test).
24  This result suggests, somewhat surprisingly, that those universities suffering the greatest cuts 
improved their relative performance the most.  However, on closer analysis, this result was found to be 
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25  When Salford was excluded, a 
positive, but non-significant, correlation of 0.146 was obtained.  The weakness of this correlation may be 
due to the fact that many universities were able to offset the cuts in Treasury funding with increased 
income from elsewhere, e.g. from overseas students (cf. Johnes & Taylor, 1990, p. 35).  Another 
possibility is that those universities worst affected by the cuts made the most effort to enhance 
efficiency.
26
  Table 4 shows that the TE index rose by only 1.3% between 1980/81 and 1984/85.  The modest size 
of this gain can also be confirmed by examining the TE graph in Figure 6.  This evidence suggests, 
therefore, that the cuts had little impact on universities' technical efficiency. Furthermore, Figure 6 
reveals that TFP was not affected in any obvious way.  The TFP graph is, in fact, virtually a straight line 
over this period. 
  The financial pressure on universities continued unabated throughout the 1980s.  One measure of 
this pressure is the proportion of recurrent income received from the Treasury; this fell fairly steadily 
from 83.0% in 1982/83 to 71.1% in 1988/89, before dropping sharply to 61.4% in 1989/90.  The 
Treasury's share then declined gradually for three years, reaching 59.3% in 1992/93.
27  The abrupt cut in 
Treasury funding in 1989/90 provides a possible explanation of the sharp fall in the TE index in that 
year, which brought the prolonged rising trend in the TFP index to a sudden end. 
  Whilst the cuts in Treasury funding were regrettable in one sense, they did give universities greater 
financial independence and hence flexibility.  Furthermore, a switch in the balance of public funding 
from block grants towards fee income was announced in April 1989.  As a consequence, the proportion 
of recurrent income received from home students' fees increased sharply from 1990/91 onwards.
28  The 
aim of this policy was to give universities an incentive to admit more students.  Also worth noting is the 
introduction in 1991/92 of competitive tendering for students (see Johnes & Taylor, 1990, pp. 42–47). 
  The switch to a more decentralized funding regime, along with improvements in the management of 
universities following the Jarratt Committee's report (1985), can probably explain the rise in the technical 
efficiency of universities from 1987/88 onwards, as illustrated in Figure 6.  However, how can we 
explain the curious ‘spoon’ shape of the TECH graph from 1987/88 onwards?  The answer probably lies 
in the rapid and highly unbalanced expansion of universities, which caused a sharp rise in the student : 
staff ratio from 1988/89 onwards.  When combined with inadequate funding, it is hardly surprising that 
this overexpansion in the number of students should cause the potential output of universities to stall and 





As an extremal method, DEA is known to be highly sensitive to erroneous data and unusual observations 
(Sexton  et al., 1986, pp. 73–87; Wilson, 1995).  The efficiency scores also tend to be affected by 
changes in the set of variables used in the analysis.  Here we shall investigate the impact of replacing the 
number of first-class degrees with a broader output variable, the number of firsts and upper seconds.  
Comparative data were available only for the first eight years of the study period,
30 and the existence of 
undivided seconds at Oxford, Edinburgh and Glasgow meant that these universities could not be 
included in the analysis.  In addition, Cambridge was excluded because of an upward bias in its recorded 
numbers of firsts and upper seconds.
31
  Although leaving out these four universities is unfortunate in one sense, it does afford an opportunity 
to assess the impact of altering the composition of the sample.  Cambridge is a manifestly atypical 
university in terms of its output of first-class degrees and it is, therefore, invariably on the efficiency 
frontier.  Whilst Oxford is less of an extreme case than Cambridge, it nonetheless has a TE score of unity 
in twelve years out of thirteen.  By contrast, Edinburgh is fully efficient in seven years out of thirteen 
and Glasgow achieves this distinction only in the last two years.  (The frontier universities are identified 
in Appendix C, Table 7.) 
  See Table 5 
  The effects of excluding the four universities mentioned above plus Ulster are shown in Table 5.  
Ulster was excluded because it is atypical in certain respects.
32  One can see that the mean scores are 
invariably higher than before, which is in line with expectations.  However, the differences between the 
two sets of scores are much larger in the period up to 1987/88 than they are in the subsequent five years. 
A possible explanation of this phenomenon is the fact that, by 1988/89, the differences between 
Cambridge and most other universities had diminished substantially in terms of the recorded number of 
first-class degrees awarded per member of staff.
33
  Table 5 also shows that the use of a broader output variable, the number of firsts and upper seconds, 
yields much higher mean TE scores.  This is in line with expectations: most universities should be able to 
achieve an enhanced TE score when judged in terms of this less stringent criterion.  There is also much 
  15less variation across universities in the number of firsts plus upper seconds than there is in the number of 
firsts.  This greater degree of similarity should likewise contribute towards higher mean scores. 
  It is worth noting too that, when we use the number of firsts as the output variable, there is no 
evidence of an improvement in TE between 1980/81 and 1987/88.  This is true for both N = 45 and 
N = 40.  By contrast, not only does the use of a broader output variable raise the mean TE scores, but it 
also results in a marked rise in these scores over time.  A plausible explanation of these better scores is 
that universities were becoming more similar in terms of their propensity to award a first or upper 
second.  However, while both the number, v, and the proportion, π, of students awarded a first or upper 
second rose steadily between 1980/81 and 1987/88, the coefficients of variation of v and π remained 
remarkably stable over this period.  Hence some other factor must lie behind the upward trend in the 
mean scores shown in the last column of Table 5. 
  See Figure 7 
  Figure 7 illustrates the consequences of excluding the five universities.  One can see that, in terms of 
their general shape, the three graphs are remarkably similar to those in Figure 6.  In fact, the only real 
difference is in the shape of the TECH graph between 1987/88 and 1989/90.  This difference can readily 
be explained, however, in terms of the change in the composition of the set of efficient universities: 
when Cambridge is dropped from the sample, a pronounced peak occurs in the output of first-class 
degrees in 1988/89, which is clearly visible in Figure 7 in the form of a ‘hump’ in the TECH graph.
34  
Apart from this minor aberration, it seems fair to conclude that the results are not very sensitive to 
changes in the composition of the sample.  What is more, the TFP graphs end up at almost exactly the 
same spot in 1992/93, reflecting a growth over the study period of 51.5% in the full sample and 49.9% in 
the subsample. 
  The DEA software used in this study has an output orientation and it is well known that the 
orientation employed affects the results in terms of returns to scale (Seiford & Zhu, 1999, pp. 3–4; Färe 
& Grosskopf, 1994).  As the final part of this sensitivity analysis, the DEAP program was used to re-
examine the question of returns to scale.  DEAP generated exactly the same TE scores as our own 
program but slightly different SE scores.  Using an output-orientated approach, DEAP calculated a rise 
of 1.6% in scale efficiency between 1980/81 and 1992/93.  This is very close to the 1.5% indicated in 
Table 4.  However, when an input-orientated approach was employed, DEAP calculated a somewhat 
larger rise of 2.8% in scale efficiency.  Thus the orientation adopted does make some difference to the 
  16results. 
 
Conclusion 
This study has used data envelopment analysis (DEA) and Malmquist indices to assess the performance 
of 45 British universities over the period 1980/81 to 1992/93.  Unlike most earlier studies of the 
efficiency of universities, the focus here has been on measuring changes in performance over time rather 
than on assessing relative efficiency in a single academic year.  As a first step, a technical efficiency 
(TE) score was computed for each university for each academic year.  These scores were then 
aggregated by calculating the weighted geometric mean.  The WGMte rose from 0.859 in 1980/81 to 
0.916 in 1992/93. 
  The Malmquist analysis revealed a rise of 51.5% in total factor productivity (TFP) over the study 
period.  What is interesting about this growth in TFP is that it was brought about predominantly by a 
marked outward shift in the efficiency frontier rather than by enhanced technical efficiency (TE): 
whereas frontier technology improved by 39.1%, TE rose by only 8.8%.  Whilst this rise in TE may 
seem unimpressive, one needs to remember that the DEA efficiency scores were, in most cases, very 
high at the outset.  As regards the causes of this rise in TE, the results indicated a 4.1% rise in pure 
technical efficiency, a 2.9% rise in congestion efficiency and a 1.5% rise in scale efficiency. 
  Given the rapid rise in the average size of British universities from 1988/89 onwards, it is not 
surprising to find that only nine universities were still subject to increasing returns to scale in 1992/93, 
whereas twenty-one were experiencing decreasing returns.  However, these deviations from constant 
returns were not typically very large.  Indeed, scale efficiency remained high throughout the period 
1980/81 to 1992/93 and in no year was a significant correlation found between universities' TE scores 
and their size, as proxied by the number of students. 
  Other authors have likewise failed to detect any pronounced scale effects.  For instance, using DEA 
and data for 1992/93, Athanassopoulos and Shale (1997) found that the imposition of constant returns 
caused only a slight fall in the mean efficiency scores.
35  Similarly, the results obtained by Izadi et al. 
(2002), using data for 1994/95 and the stochastic cost model discussed earlier, provide no grounds for 
rejecting the hypothesis of constant returns.
36  This conclusion is not, however, supported by the findings 
of Glass et al. (1995a,b), who found evidence of increasing returns.
37  It is also worth noting that, when 
the results of cost studies are disaggregated, strongly increasing returns emerge for postgraduate tuition, 
  17but the findings are more mixed with regard to undergraduate tuition and research.
38
  During the 1980s, British universities were under severe financial and political pressure to raise 
efficiency.  In view of the 51.5% rise in TFP, it is evident that an impressive rise in productivity did 
indeed occur.  What is more, the DEA results show a large improvement in TE as well, particularly from 
1987/88 onwards.  It is clear that the typical university was getting closer to the ‘best practice’ 
exemplified by the frontier universities.  This is important in the sense that the sector as a whole cannot 
attain its full potential if technical inefficiency continues to exist.
39  Whilst the financial and managerial 
reforms introduced in the 1980s were probably not the sole cause of the enhanced efficiency of British 
universities, it does seem likely that they were the driving force.  Even so, one might argue that the cuts 
in Treasury funding could have been introduced in a less disruptive way, especially in the early 1980s.  
This factor probably delayed the improvement in TE. 
  An unusual facet of the present study is its examination of the role of congestion efficiency (CE) and 
some comments on this are warranted.  WGMce rose steadily between 1984/85 and 1988/89, but 
fluctuated markedly thereafter.  It would seem that, during this first period, universities were able to 
reduce congestion because there was only a moderate growth in student numbers and no rise in the 
student : staff ratio.  By contrast, the second period was characterized by a sharply rising student : staff 
ratio, which made it very difficult to achieve any further gains in CE.  Indeed, it is remarkable that the 
rapid expansion in the number of students from 1988/89 onwards did not cause a pronounced fall in CE. 
Taking the study period as a whole, WGMce rose from 0.942 to 0.967. 
  Notwithstanding the fluctuations in WGMce, the number of universities exhibiting congestion 
remained high throughout the study period; this number fluctuated in the range 19 to 26.  What this 
finding suggests is that a large proportion of universities were experiencing negative marginal 
productivity in terms of one or more of their inputs.  In other words, they could have produced a larger 
output by reducing the quantity used of any congested input.  An excessive number of undergraduate 
students is the most likely cause of this congestion. 
  Still, one should be cautious when considering these findings.  For instance, Coelli et al. (1998, p. 
175) warn that “... unless one has a strong reason for suspecting congestion one should not go looking 
for it because one will often find it whether or not it actually exists”.  This is because the so-called 
congestion may merely reflect the paucity of data in the extremities of the isoquants.  However, given the 
relatively large sample used in this study, along with the strong a priori grounds for suspecting 
  18congestion, there is no good reason to believe that the findings obtained here are spurious. 
  Another caveat concerns the procedure used to identify and measure congestion.  In common with 
most earlier studies of congestion, this one has followed the procedure developed by Färe, Grosskopf 
and Lovell (FGL) and their associates.  This approach has been criticized by Cooper et al. (2001a), who 
use hypothetical examples to demonstrate that the FGL approach can (i) find congestion where it does 
not exist and (ii) fail to find congestion where it does exist.  Cooper et al. (CGL) also criticize the 
axiomatic approach taken by Färe et al. and their disregard of slacks.  However, CGL's first example of 
apparent failure of the FGL approach probably reflects the peculiarities of the particular data set 
employed rather than an absence of congestion.
40  Their second example refers to a rather unusual 
situation in which both factors of production have negative marginal products.  Here CGL claim that 
FGL would wrongly attribute the technical inefficiency to PTE rather than to CE.
41
  Although it is possible to raise valid objections to the FGL approach, it seems unlikely that these 
would invalidate the findings of this study.  For instance, it is improbable that one would encounter cases 
where universities were suffering from negative marginal productivity with respect to more than one 
input.  What is more relevant is whether the two approaches would differ substantially in terms of the 
calculated amount of congestion.  Here we should note the observation by Färe and Grosskopf (2000, pp. 
32–33) that their approach would generally measure a smaller amount of congestion.
42
  In addition to a re-examination of congestion using the CGL approach, there are several ways in 
which this study could be refined and extended.  For instance, since the most able students tend to obtain 
places at the more prestigious universities, an output variable such as the number of first-class degrees 
automatically gives certain universities an undue advantage.  This problem might be addressed in future 
research by including a variable reflecting students' ability on intake, so that we could measure the ‘value 
added’ by each university.  The most obvious measure here is ‘A’ level scores or their equivalent, 
although their use as a measure of the quality of a university's student intake has attracted criticism.
43
  The use of earnings from research and consultancy as a measure of output can also be criticized and 
it would be interesting to see, as a sensitivity analysis, what difference it would make if we were to 
measure research output using scores from the research assessment exercises of 1989 and 1992.
44  
Another potentially fruitful area for investigation is the impact of time lags in the response of outputs to 
inputs.  These lags are likely to be especially important where there has been a large and sudden change 
in the intake of undergraduate students. 
  19  The last year examined here, 1992/93, coincided with the creation of a large number of new 
universities from the former polytechnics and colleges.  Therefore, by extending the sample period, it 
might be possible to see what effect competition from these newer universities has had on the efficiency 
of the older ones.  It would also be interesting to test whether significant differences exist between the 
efficiency of new and traditional universities. 
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  2.   Our study was inspired by the work of Al-Naji (1995). 
 
  3.   See Byrnes et al. (1984), Färe et al. (1985a) and Field (1990) for earlier applications of this 
approach. 
 
    4.   See, for example, Tomkins & Green (1988), Beasley (1990), Johnes & Johnes (1993), 
Johnes (1995) and Beasley (1995). 
 
  5.   Izadi et al. use UK data for 1994/95 to derive estimates of technical inefficiency for 99 separate 
institutions.  To achieve this, they employ a method proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982) to 
separate out the two components of the error term in model (1). 
 
  6.   Silkman (1986) and Boussofiane et al. (1991) provide excellent non-technical introductions to 
DEA.  A comprehensive and up-to-date introduction to DEA and its applications is given in 
Cooper et al. (2000a).  See also Coelli et al. (1998, chapters 6 & 7). 
 
  7.   There are several possible ways of dealing with these problems; see, for example, Atkinson & 
Wilson (1995), Cooper et al. (2000a, pp. 200–205) and Färe et al. (1985a). 
 
  8.   It is worth mentioning that, for computational purposes, the problem would need to be set out in 
a different way; see, for example, Boussofiane et al. (1991, pp. 1–2).  However, such 
computational details need not detain us here. 
 
  9.   For a detailed discussion of possible ways of measuring research performance, see Johnes and 
Taylor (1990, chapter 9). 
 
10.   With DEA, efficiency scores tend to rise (and can never fall) as the number of inputs or outputs 
increases (Nunamaker, 1985; Sexton et al., 1986, pp. 82–87).  Having too many variables 
reduces the discriminatory power of the technique.  This point is well illustrated by the study by 
Athanassopoulos and Shale (1997), who use nine variables and get a mean efficiency score of 
0.9716. 
 
11.   9.3% of undergraduates in UK universities gained first-class degrees in 1992/93, compared with 
7.5% in 1986/87 and 6.1% in 1980/81. 
 
12.   A conventional test for difference in means indicates that there is no significant difference 
between the mean TE scores in 1980/81 and 1986/87 (z = 0.11), yet a highly significant 
difference emerges when 1986/87 is compared with 1992/93 (z = 2.80).  Although an appeal to 
the central limit theorem is not unreasonable in this case, given N = 45, the ‘bootstrapping’ 
method might have been used instead of a conventional test (Atkinson & Wilson, 1995).   
However, it seems unlikely that the two procedures would have generated noticeably different 
outcomes. 
 
13.   It is worth noting that the observed ‘best practice’ captured in a DEA frontier differs from the 
concept of efficiency embodied in an isoquant, viz the minimum requirements for producing a 
given level of output.  However, in a large sample, the DEA frontier is likely to be a close 
approximation to an isoquant (see Banker, 1993, on this point). 
  2114.   A slight distortion is introduced in 1984/85 as a result of the merger between Ulster University 
and Ulster Polytechnic, which had the effect of raising Ulster's weight from 0.0077 to 0.0297. 
 
15.   The correlation coefficients were 0.072, 0.117, 0.091 and 0.079.  Even the largest of these is 
significant only at p = 0.445. 
 
16.   A similar diagram is employed by Färe et al. (1985a, p. 95), although it is worth noting that the 
efficiency of their frontier firm B can be called into question, given the existence of non-zero 
slack in one of the inputs. 
 
17.   Under constant returns to scale, a rise (fall) of x% in both inputs would raise (reduce) output by 
exactly x%.  Universities operating under constant returns are necessarily fully efficient. 
 
18.   More formally, the productive technology is free from ‘congestion’ if an increase in any input, 
with all other inputs held constant, does not reduce output.  In this situation, the inputs are said 
to be strongly (or freely) disposable.  Cf. Byrnes et al., 1984, p. 672. 
 
19.    The gradient along any segment of an isoquant can be derived from the equation 
dQ = (∂Q/∂X1)dX1 + (∂Q/∂X2)dX2  = 0, where the partial derivatives represent marginal 
products.  The gradient, dX2/dX1, can thus be expressed as –MP1/MP2.  Along segment HM′ of 
isoquant M′M, MP1 > 0 and MP2 < 0, so that dX2/dX1 > 0.  Here a rise in the number of students 
would have to be accompanied by a rise in the number of staff, otherwise output would fall.  In 
contrast, along the broken vertical section HM′′, a rise in the number of students, with the 
number of staff held constant, would not reduce output.  This is because there is no congestion 
and MP2 is zero rather than negative.  Of course, congestion may apply to both students and 
staff.  However, this possibility need not be pursued here; for an exhaustive discussion of 
possible cases, see Färe et al. (1994a). 
 
20.   Notice that, rounding apart, the TE column in Table 2 is the product of the next three columns.  
This is a property of geometric means. 
 
21.   Note that the number of fully efficient universities is identical to the number experiencing 
constant returns to scale.  The irs group in 1992/93 comprised Bath (0.9959), Bristol (0.9935), 
Brunel (0.9861), Essex (0.9399), Keele (0.8846), Kent (0.9903), UMIST (1.0000), Surrey 
(0.9975) and Dundee (0.9509).  (Rounded SE scores are given in brackets.)  The method of 
distinguishing between increasing and decreasing returns to scale is explained in Appendix B.  
See also Byrnes et al. (1984, pp. 673–675). 
 
22.   Examples of this approach include Färe et al. (1992, 1994b) and Burgess & Wilson (1995). 
 
23.   The numbers in the first two columns of Table 4 are not, in fact, correct to three decimal places 
as they had to be calculated using the rounded data in Table 3. 
 
24.   The figures for the percentage change in Treasury funding were obtained from Johnes and 
Taylor (1990, Table 3.1).  N = 43 because Wales and Ulster had to be left out. 
 
25.   Salford suffered a cut in real Treasury funding of 36.4%, yet its TE score rose from 0.488 in 
1980/81 to unity in 1984/85.  This university is clearly an outlier. 
 
26.   It must also be recognized that Treasury funding is likely to be positively correlated with 
aggregate departmental expenditure, which is one of the inputs in the DEA model.  This would 
tend to weaken any correlation between TE scores and changes in funding. 
 
27.   Sources: University Statistics, vol. 3, Table 1 and its various disaggregations; Johnes & Taylor 
(1990, Table 3.2). 
  2228.   In 1989/90, home students' fees constituted only 6.4% of universities' recurrent income.   
However, this proportion increased to 12.9% in 1990/91 and to 17.0% in 1991/92.  Source: 
University Statistics, vol. 3, Table 1 and its various disaggregations. 
 
29.   In an effort to shed some light on the curious shape of the TECH graph, the maximum values of 
the twelve productivity ratios (output 1/input 1, output 1/input 2, etc.) were plotted over time.  
This analysis revealed a high degree of volatility over the period 1987/88 to 1992/93.   
Furthermore, the ratios frequently moved in opposite directions and no coherent pattern was 
evident.  The analysis suggested, for instance, that the decline in the TECH graph between 
1989/90 and 1990/91 was due to a sharp drop in the output of postgraduate awards, which was 
reinforced by lower earnings from research and consultancy but partially offset by a higher 
output of first-class degrees.  By contrast, the flatness of the graph between 1987/88 and 
1989/90 was the result of offsetting movements in the three output variables.  It is also worth 
noting that, by the end of this turbulent five-year period, the most productive university was 
producing 24.6% more postgraduate awards per member of staff, 13.5% higher earnings from 
research and consultancy but 7.7% fewer first-class degrees. 
 
30.   Johnes and Taylor (1990, Table 7.1) give figures for the proportion of graduates awarded a first 
or an upper second.  These proportions were then multiplied by the number of first degrees 
awarded. 
 
31.   See University Statistics, vol. 3, 1993/94, p. 93. 
 
32.   This university merged with Ulster Polytechnic in October 1984 and, as a result, it became the 
fifth largest university (out of 41) instead of the smallest.  Ulster's TE score fell from 0.549 in 
1983/84 to 0.468 in 1984/85 and this decline was accentuated by its increased weighting.  Ulster 
was responsible for a large fall in the weighted mean TE score in 1984/85, although its presence 
was less marked in subsequent years. 
 
33.   The recorded number of first-class degrees per member of staff in Cambridge fell from 0.367 in 
1980/81 to 0.263 in 1992/93.  By contrast, the output of firsts in the most productive university 
in the subsample of N = 40 rose from 0.111 to 0.177.  The smallest gap in productivity was in 
1988/89. 
 
34.   The output of first-class degrees per member of staff in Cambridge rose from 0.285 to 0.290 
(+1.8%) between 1987/88 and 1988/89 and then fell by 8.6% to 0.265 in 1989/90.  By contrast, 
the output in the most productive university in the subsample rose from 0.143 to 0.225 (+57.3%) 
between 1987/88 and 1988/89 but then fell by 20% to 0.180 in 1989/90. 
 
35.   See the mean ‘outcome efficiency’ scores in Athanassopoulos and Shale (1997, Table 4). 
 
36.   See the figures for ‘ray returns to scale’ given in Izadi et al. (2002, Table 2).  These results are 
based upon a sample comprising both new and traditional universities (N = 99). 
 
37.   It is worth noting that Glass et al. did not use a frontier approach in fitting their cost function. 
 
38.   See, for example, Izadi et al. (2002, Table 2), Johnes (1997, Table 2) and Glass et al. (1995a,b). 
 
39.   It is worth emphasizing that DEA measures efficiency relative to ‘best practice’ rather than 
‘average practice’.  It sets a tough standard and it would be naïve to believe that a unitary value 
of WGMte could ever be achieved.  For instance, some of the universities with high TE scores 
have special positions in the market (e.g. Cambridge and Oxford), enabling them to attract high-
quality inputs (staff, students and other resources) and thus produce high-quality outputs.  Other 
universities (e.g. Edinburgh and Bristol) enjoy attractive locations. 
  2340.   Cooper et al. (2001a) use a numerical example taken from Färe et al. (1985b, p. 76) to criticize 
the FGL approach.  Seven DMUs are involved, all of which produce y = 2, using two inputs, x1 
and x2.  Using the FGL approach, DMUs 6 and 7 are found to suffer from congestion, yet 
Cooper  et al. contend (p. 67) that there is no evidence of congestion because output has 
remained constant.  However, if we were to recast this example slightly by raising the output of 
DMU6 from 2 to 2.25 and relabelling the axes as x2/y and x1/y, it is easy to see that congestion 
(in accordance with their Definition 1, p. 62) would exist. 
 
41.   Cooper et al. (2001a, Fig. 2) construct an example in which a DMU G is clearly suffering from 
negative marginal productivity in both of its inputs.  They claim that G is suffering from 
congestion.  However, one must question the economic realism of this example.  It would not, 
for instance, be consistent with the law of variable proportions.  Under the FGL approach, such 
examples would be ruled out by the axiom of weak disposability. 
 
42.   The reason for this difference is that, unlike CGL, FGL “do not include a measure of the slack 
that exists when [their] measure signals congestion” (Färe & Grosskopf, 2000, p. 32).  In fact, 
FGL treat slacks as akin to allocative inefficiency, whereas CGL regard slacks as a form of 
technical inefficiency.  For a detailed comparison and contrast of the two approaches, see 
Brockett  et al. (1998), Cherchye et al. (2001), Cooper et al. (2000b, 2001a,b) and Färe & 
Grosskopf (2000).  It is worth noting that not all cases of upward-sloping isoquants would be 
treated as congestion under the FGL approach (see Färe & Grosskopf, 2000, p. 28, for 
examples). 
 
43.   Athanassopoulos and Shale (1997) use A-level entry scores averaged over the previous three 
years as a separate input variable in their DEA study.  However, it might be more appropriate to 
construct a single input variable measuring both quality and quantity of undergraduates. 
 
44.   Athanassopoulos and Shale (1997) use weighted scores from the 1992 RAE as an output 
variable and research income as an input variable.  See also Glass et al. (1995a,b) and Johnes & 
Taylor (1990, chapter 9). 
  24Appendix A:  Definitions of variables, sources of data and explanatory notes 
 
Number of students.  This refers to the ‘full-time equivalent student load’ of undergraduates and 
postgraduates.  The latter include both research students and those on taught courses.  The London and 
Manchester business schools (which have no undergraduates) were excluded from the analysis. 
Number of staff.  This comprises both academic and academic-related staff.  Academic staff are those 
whose function is either teaching and research or solely research.  Academic-related staff are those who 
do not have a main teaching or research function but are paid on national, or equivalent, academic or 
academic-related scales.  Following a convention adopted by official statisticians, part-time staff were 
given a weight of 0.5. 
Aggregate departmental expenditure.  This is defined here as total departmental recurrent expenditure 
other than that on academic and academic-related staff plus departmental equipment expenditure, 
summed over all departments in a given university. 
Income from research and consultancy.  This comprises income from research grants and contracts plus 
income for other services rendered. 
First-class degrees.  This refers to the number of first-class honours degrees awarded to undergraduates. 
Degrees obtained at affiliated institutions are not included. 
Higher degrees.  This includes doctorates and other higher degrees. 
 
Data for the variables listed above were obtained from University Statistics, vol. 3, various tables and 
years.  It was noted that, in this publication, students and staff are enumerated as at 1 December, whereas 
qualifications obtained refer to a calendar year.  Since undergraduate degrees are typically awarded in 
early summer, it was presumed that first-class degrees awarded in, say, 1986 related to the 1985/86 
academic year.  The situation was less clearcut with respect to higher degrees.  Here it was decided to 
assign qualifications obtained in, say, 1986 to the 1986/87 academic year. 
 
Aggregated data for the key variables are displayed in Table 6. 
  See Table 6 
  25Appendix B:  Constructing the reference technology 
The aim of this appendix is to explain the method of calculating the four measures of efficiency used in 
this study.  The analysis mirrors that of Byrnes et al. (1984) and Färe et al. (1985a), although the 
exposition has been simplified considerably in order to highlight and clarify the salient points.  It should 
be noted that the linear programming (LP) problems are formulated here in terms of maximizing output 
for given inputs, unlike the discussion in the text where, for expositional reasons, the problem was 
couched in terms of minimizing inputs for a given output (as in an isoquant analysis).  These approaches 
are equivalent only in the case of constant returns. 
  Suppose that there are three universities, R, U and T, and that each uses one input, X, to produce a 
single output, Q.  If the technology is well behaved and satisfies the assumptions of constant returns to 
scale and non-congestion, then the best-practice technology can be constructed by solving the following 
LP problem for each university i (i = r, u, t): 
  Maximize  ωi (1) 
  subject  to: 
  Q rZr + QuZu + QtZt – Qiωi ≥ 0  (2) 
  X rZr + XuZu + XtZt – Xi ≤ 0  (3) 
  Z r, Zu, Zt ≥ 0  (4) 
where Z = (Zr, Zu, Zt) is a set of weights to be determined.  By taking the reciprocal of the optimal value 
of ωi, one can obtain the technical efficiency (TE) score of university i. 
  See Figure 8 
  Best practice is depicted in Figure 8 by the ray OZ, which represents maximum average 
productivity.  Clearly, university R is inefficient in the sense that its observed output, Qr, falls short of its 
potential output, Qr*, so that TEr = Qr/Qr* < 1.  The same is true for university T.  Only university U is 
fully efficient. 
  In order to decompose TE into its components, the assumptions of constant returns to scale and 
non-congestion need to be relaxed.  Let us first relax the assumption of constant returns.  The best-
practice technology can then be constructed by solving the following LP problem: 
  Maximize  θi                      (5) 
  subject  to: 
  Q rZr + QuZu + QtZt – Qiθi ≥ 0   (6) 
  26  X rZr + XuZu + XtZt – Xi ≤ 0  (7) 
  Z r + Zu + Zt = 1  (8) 
  Z r, Zu, Zt ≥ 0  (9) 
The new constraint Zr + Zu + Zt = 1 yields a solution that, in Figure 8, corresponds to the modified best-
practice technology bounded by the X-axis starting at Xr, the broken line XrRUT, and its horizontal 
extension from T.  Any university located on this boundary would be deemed to be efficient in terms of 
the modified technology and would have a modified technical efficiency (MTE) score of unity.  It should 
be noted that MTEi = 1/θi. 
 To  measure  scale efficiency, consider the optimal ray OZ in Figure 8, which depicts constant 
returns to scale.  Only university U is scale efficient (SEi = 1).  University R is inefficient in the sense 
that it is experiencing increasing returns to scale and is thus too small.  Its scale efficiency can be 
measured by the ratio SEr = Qr/Qr*, which is well below unity.  The proportion of potential output lost as 
a consequence of this university's failure to operate at the correct scale can be measured by (1 – SEr). By 
contrast, university T has become too large and is experiencing diseconomies of scale.  Its scale 
efficiency can be measured in a similar way. 
  Scale efficiency is captured by the ratio SEi = TEi/MTEi.  For universities R and T, MTEi = 1, so 
that TEi = SEi.  Thus, for these universities, the sole source of technical inefficiency is an inappropriate 
scale.  However, university S is suffering from two sources of inefficiency: it is too large and it is 
operating beneath the frontier depicting best-practice technology, so that TEs = SEs × MTEs, where SEs 
and MTEs are both below unity. 
  To determine whether the deviation from the optimal scale is due to increasing or decreasing 
returns to scale, we need to reformulate the LP problem as: 
  Maximize  θi*              ( 1 0 )  
  subject  to: 
  Q rZr + QuZu + QtZt – Qiθi* ≥ 0   (11) 
  X rZr + XuZu + XtZt – Xi ≤ 0  (12) 
  Z r + Zu + Zt ≤ 1  (13) 
  Z r, Zu, Zt ≥ 0  (14) 
Again referring to Figure 8, the new constraint Zr + Zu + Zt ≤ 1 restricts the solution to a technology 
bounded by the X-axis, OUT, and the line emanating from T parallel to the X-axis.  This modified 
  27technology rules out increasing returns.  Thus, if there is scale inefficiency (SEi < 1), it is due to 
decreasing returns if θi* = θi (the case of T) or to increasing returns if θi* > θi (the case of R).  This is 
because university R becomes technically inefficient under the newly specified reference technology, 
whereas university T is unaffected. 
  To test for congestion inefficiency, we drop the assumption that all inputs have non-negative 
marginal products.  The best-practice technology can now be constructed by solving the following LP 
problem: 
  Maximize  φi (15) 
  subject  to: 
  Q rZr + QuZu + QtZt – Qiφi ≥ 0  (16) 
  X rZr + XuZu + XtZt – Xiψi = 0  (17) 
  Z r + Zu + Zt = 1  (18) 
  Z r, Zu, Zt ≥ 0  (19) 
  0   ≤ ψi ≤ 1  (20) 
where ψi is a parameter which has been introduced to effect a proportional scaling of the inputs; this 
allows for an isoquant with an upward-sloping segment such as HM′ in Figure 4.  By taking the 
reciprocal of the optimal value of φi, one can obtain the ‘pure’ technical efficiency (PTE) score of 
university i.  If PTE = 1, then a university is operating on an efficient isoquant, but may be experiencing 
scale or congestion inefficiency or possibly both. 
  To measure congestion, we need to determine the proportional reduction in inputs, if any, that is 
required to reach the closest congestion-free technology.  Byrnes et al. (1984, p. 676) show that 
congestion efficiency can be measured by the ratio CEi = MTEi/PTEi, so that MTEi = CEi × PTEi.  If we 
recall that TEi = SEi × MTEi, then we can express technical efficiency as the product of its three 
component indices, to wit: 
 TEi = SEi × CEi × PTEi (21) 
Clearly, if the technology is non-congested and exhibits constant returns to scale, then CEi = 1, SEi = 1 
and TEi = PTEi. 
  It should be noted that the treatment of scale efficiency, as discussed above, differs from that in 
Banker (1984), Banker et al. (1984), and Banker & Thrall (1992).  These papers employ an input 
orientation and use a different procedure to measure scale efficiency.  Congestion efficiency is not 
  28considered.  For an application of this approach, see Johnes (1995).  However, Banker et al. (1996) and 
Seiford & Zhu (1999) argue that the alternative methods of determining returns to scale in DEA differ 
more in terms of procedure than substance.  See also Färe & Grosskopf (1994). 
 
 
Appendix C:  Results for individual universities 
 
Table 7 identifies universities whose TE score fell in the top decile in a given academic year in the 
period 1982–93.  The arithmetic mean TE score achieved in this period is given in the last column as a 
percentage.  The following symbols are used: 
***   denotes TEi = 1 (these universities constitute the efficiency frontier) 
**   denotes  0.9500  ≤ TEi < 1 
*   denotes  0.9000  ≤ TEi < 0.9500 
  See Table 7 
 
It should be noted that universities have been evaluated in terms of their degree of success in producing 
the following outputs from given inputs: 
•  income from research and consultancy 
•  first-class honours graduates 
•  successful postgraduate students 
 
Clearly, other criteria would have generated somewhat different rankings.  For this reason, the emphasis 
has been placed on discussing trends in the sector as a whole, rather than on examining the results for 
individual universities.  Nonetheless, the scores are of some interest in their own right inasmuch as they 
indicate the sorts of results that can be generated by using the variables employed in this study.  It is 
worth noting that Athanassopoulos and Shale (1997, Appendix B) present some very different results.  A 
case in point is Ulster: this university is fully efficient across all of their specifications, yet our analysis 
yields a TE score of only 0.756 for Ulster in 1992/93. 
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1980/81  0.861 0.871 0.859 0.144 0.488 
1981/82  0.863 0.878 0.868 0.132 0.596 
1982/83  0.869 0.880 0.870 0.123 0.649 
1983/84  0.858 0.868 0.857 0.131 0.549 
1984/85  0.870 0.870 0.858 0.133 0.468 
1985/86  0.871 0.866 0.853 0.135 0.501 
1986/87  0.864 0.863 0.852 0.123 0.564 
1987/88  0.873 0.872 0.860 0.128 0.575 
1988/89  0.898 0.900 0.894 0.098 0.629 
1989/90  0.883 0.882 0.874 0.113 0.587 
1990/91  0.921 0.921 0.917 0.076 0.762 
1991/92  0.923 0.920 0.916 0.084 0.708 
1992/93  0.926 0.920 0.916 0.077 0.742 
 
  33 Table  2.  Decomposition of technical efficiency (weighted geometric means) (N = 45) 
 














efficiency  crs drs irs 
1980/81 0.859 0.954 0.942  0.955  16  14  15 
1981/82 0.868 0.950 0.947  0.964  14  15  16 
1982/83 0.870 0.960 0.937  0.967  15  13  17 
1983/84 0.857 0.965 0.945  0.940  11  19  15 
1984/85 0.858 0.969 0.923  0.959  17  20    8 
1985/86 0.853 0.963 0.935  0.948  13  19  13 
1986/87 0.852 0.972 0.939  0.934  13  15  17 
1987/88 0.860 0.974 0.946  0.933  12  19  14 
1988/89 0.894 0.970 0.962  0.958  13  15  17 
1989/90 0.874 0.968 0.941  0.959  16  12  17 
1990/91 0.917 0.983 0.961  0.971  14  14  17 
1991/92 0.916 0.990 0.951  0.973  17  18  10 
1992/93 0.916 0.984 0.967  0.963  15  21    9 
 
Note: The columns headed crs, drs and irs show the numbers of universities experiencing constant, 
decreasing or increasing returns to scale, respectively. 

























1.006 1.003  1.005 0.998  1.071  1.077 
1982/83 v. 
1981/82 
1.009 1.013  0.996 1.000  1.043  1.052 
1983/84 v. 
1982/83 
0.985 1.007  1.005 0.974  1.063  1.047 
1984/85 v. 
1983/84 
1.013 1.002  0.976 1.037  1.031  1.045 
1985/86 v. 
1984/85 
1.002 0.994  1.022 0.986  1.040  1.042 
1986/87 v. 
1985/86 
0.994 1.008  1.000 0.986  1.043  1.037 
1987/88 v. 
1986/87 
1.009 1.002  1.009 0.999  1.040  1.050 
1988/89 v. 
1987/88 
1.034 0.996  1.009 1.029  1.000  1.035 
1989/90 v. 
1988/89 
0.981 0.996  0.984 1.002  0.997  0.978 
1990/91 v. 
1989/90 
1.048 1.021  1.019 1.007  0.965  1.011 
1991/92 v. 
1990/91 
1.002 1.008  0.987 1.007  0.994  0.996 
1992/93 v. 
1991/90 
1.004 0.993  1.018 0.993  1.053  1.057 
Mean 1.007  1.003  1.003  1.001  1.028  1.036 
 























1980/81 1.000 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000 
1981/82 1.077 1.071  1.006  1.002  1.005 0.998 
1982/83 1.133 1.117  1.015  1.015  1.002 0.998 
1983/84 1.186 1.187  0.999  1.022  1.007 0.971 
1984/85 1.240 1.224  1.013  1.024  0.982 1.007 
1985/86 1.292 1.273  1.014  1.017  1.004 0.994 
1986/87 1.340 1.328  1.008  1.026  1.004 0.979 
1987/88 1.407 1.381  1.018  1.027  1.013 0.978 
1988/89 1.456 1.381  1.053  1.024  1.022 1.007 
1989/90 1.424 1.377  1.033  1.019  1.005 1.008 
1990/91 1.439 1.329  1.082  1.040  1.024 1.016 
1991/92 1.434 1.321  1.084  1.049  1.011 1.022 
1992/93 1.515 1.391  1.088  1.041  1.029 1.015 
 
  36 Table  5.  Sensitivity of technical efficiency (weighted geometric means) 
 
Using number of 1sts as output variable  Using 1sts plus 2.1s   
Academic 
year  N = 45  N = 40    N = 40 
1980/81 0.859  0.870 0.883 
1981/82 0.868  0.882 0.897 
1982/83 0.870  0.882 0.897 
1983/84 0.857  0.880 0.903 
1984/85 0.858  0.872 0.911 
1985/86 0.853  0.870 0.897 
1986/87 0.852  0.877 0.913 
1987/88 0.860  0.870 0.914 
1988/89 0.894  0.896   
1989/90 0.874  0.881   
1990/91 0.917  0.923   
1991/92 0.916  0.918   
1992/93 0.916  0.921   
 
  37Table 6.  Aggregated data for key variables 
 
                      Income from
            Number Annual  Number Annual Student: Departmental Annual research  and Annual First- Annual Annual
Academic of change    of change  staff            Expenditure  change consultancy change class change  Higher change
Year  students (%)                staff (%) ratio (£000)  (%) (£000)  (%) degrees (%) degrees (%)
1980/81  319,799 6.6  54,627  1.6  5.85     704,011    335,066    4,301  5.7  18,779  2.8 
1981/82  321,688 0.6  54,537  –0.2  5.90     680,286  –3.4  354,571  5.8  4,427  2.9  19,388  3.2 
1982/83  316,841 –1.5  53,720  –1.5  5.90     726,434  6.8  394,669  11.3  4,497  1.6  19,907  2.7 
1983/84  313,520 –1.0  54,160  0.8  5.79     769,313  5.9  441,249  11.8  4,757  5.8  21,064  5.8 
1984/85  319,892 2.0  55,870  3.2  5.73     824,986  7.2  489,019  10.8  5,069  6.6  21,367  1.4 
1985/86  324,174 1.3  57,660  3.2  5.62     866,691  5.1  540,705  10.6  5,353  5.6  23,306  9.1 
1986/87  330,013 1.8  59,310  2.9  5.56     937,259  8.1  617,001  14.1  5,375  0.4  24,329  4.4 
1987/88  335,653 1.7  60,121  1.4  5.58     919,141  –1.9  625,685  1.4  5,754  7.1  26,289  8.1 
1988/89  348,927 4.0  60,964  1.4  5.72     995,547  8.3  701,000  12.0  6,221  8.1  27,548  4.8 
1989/90                          370,666 6.2 63,119 3.5 5.87 1,052,434 5.7 714,585 1.9 6,725 8.1 29,916 8.6
1990/91                          390,526 5.4 65,662 4.0 5.95 1,084,811 3.1 748,069 4.7 7,169 6.6 31,004 3.6
1991/92                          425,550 9.0 68,055 3.6 6.25 1,108,441 2.2 761,484 1.8 7,819 9.1 34,162 13.9
1992/93                          462,829 8.8 70,019 2.9 6.61 1,161,688 4.8 846,600 11.2 8,278 5.9 38,474 12.6
 
   Note:  The expenditure and income figures were deflated using the index of university costs (1985 = 100).   40
Table 7.  Classification of universities in terms of technical efficiency: 1982/83 to 1992/93 
 
  82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91/92 92/93  % 
Aston  *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***  **  *** ***  100 
Bath       *  *      **  *  ***  **    90 
Birmingham *** * *** *  * ***  **           91 
Bradford  ***  **   *  *     *  *    90 
Bristol  *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***  **  ** 100 
Brunel  **  ***  ***  *  *      *    91 
Cambridge  *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***  100 
City  *** *** **  *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***  100 
Durham  *  *  *  *   *  *     90 
East  Anglia      *           81 
Essex     ***  ***      **  **  *  ***  *    92 
Exeter           *  ***      84 
Hull       *    **  *  *  ***    ***    87 
Keele                78 
Kent           *  **  ***  ***  **  **    92 
Lancaster  *** *** ***  **  *** *** *** *** *** *** ***  100 
Leeds                74 
Leicester                75 
Liverpool           *       73 
London  *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***  100 
Loughborough **  **  ***  *  ***  **  ***  ***  ***    **    97 
Manchester               79 
UMIST  *** *** *** *** *** *** *** **  **  ***  *    99 
Newcastle           *  *      84 
Nottingham          *       82 
Oxford  *** *** *** *** ***  ** *** *** *** *** ***  100 
Reading  *      ***  **          86 
Salford      *** *** *** *** *** ***  **  *** ***   95 
Sheffield                74 
Southampton *** *** *** **    *  ** *** *** **  **   98 
Surrey  *  ** *** *** *** *** ***  *  **  ***  *    97 
Sussex  *  **  **   *  ***   *  *     92 
Warwick  ***  **  *  *** *** *** *** *** *** ***  *    98 
York  ***  *  ***  ***    **  **  **  ***    92 
W a l e s                 7 6  
Aberdeen  **     **            86 
Dundee        *  * ***  ***  *** *  ** **    93 
Edinburgh  ***  *  *  *  *  **  ** *** *** *** ***   96 
Glasgow         *  *  *  ***  ***    85 
Heriot-Watt  *** *** *** ***    *  *  *** *** *** ***   97 
St.  Andrews     ***  *     **  ***  ***  ***    92 
Stirling         **    ***  *  ***    84 
Strathclyde            ***    83 
Belfast            **  *    76 
U l s t e r                 6 3   
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